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Muslim immigrants have come to expect discrimination in
France because of their religion, and this is unlikely to
change.
Blog Admin
There is growing concern in France that Muslim immigrants from North Africa are poorly
integrated into French society, often due to discrimination. But are they discriminated
against because of their religion, or because of their national or ethnic origins? Claire
Adida, David Lait in and Marie-Anne Valfort  address this very issue, and find that
Muslims face significantly higher levels of discrimination from rooted French (defined as
French nationals with four grandparents born in metropolitan France) than do their Christian
counterparts, and that the dynamics leading to such discrimination are likely to endure.
According to an IFOP survey conducted in October 2012 f or the French magazine
Le Figaro, 67 per cent of  the French population believes that people of  Muslim descent
are poorly integrated into French society. This survey echoes several studies that have
f ound evidence of  discrimination against Muslim immigrants f rom the Maghreb (North
Af rica). But what, exactly, do these results highlight: Maghrebi-based or Muslim-based
discrimination?
Since 2009, we have conducted research aimed at investigating the integration of
Muslims in France. In Western Europe, France is home to the largest proportion of
Muslims, or 7.5 per cent in 2010. Our goal was to answer the f ollowing questions: are
Muslims discriminated as Muslims (rather than as Arabs or Maghrebis) in the French
labour market? If  so, what is the nature of  such discrimination and what sustains it? We
investigated these questions by f ocusing on a group of  immigrants f rom two
ethnolinguistic groups in Senegal, the Joolas and the Serers. These groups are divided
by religion, with one portion of  them being Muslim and another Christian. With the exception of  religion,
these Senegalese Muslims and Senegalese Christians are similar. They share the same culture and
migrated to France in the same era (during the early 1970s) and with the same economic motivations.
This sample theref ore allows us to isolate the religious ef f ect f rom national, ethnic and racial f actors.
Are Muslims discriminated on the French labour market? 
Relying on a correspondence test in which we compared French companies evaluating CVs f rom
otherwise identical Senegalese Muslim and Senegalese Christian applicants, we f ound signif icant levels
of  anti-Senegalese Muslim discrimination in job interview callback rates. Moreover, using a survey of  511
second and third-generation Joolas and Serers in France, we f ound an income dif f erential between
Senegalese Muslim and Christian households amounting to 17 per cent of  France’s median income.
Monthly income dif f erentials (in euros) across Senegalese Muslim and Christian households are shown
in Figure 1 below. This result suggests that the discrimination Senegalese Muslim candidates f ace on the
French labor market may have serious implications f or their welf are.
Figure 1- Total income effect of Christian vs. Muslim household (Hh)
What is the nature of such discrimination? 
We investigate the nature of  anti-Muslim discrimination in France by relying on our survey of  Senegalese
Christians and Senegalese Muslims as well as f ield experimental data conducted in France among rooted
French, Senegalese Muslims and Senegalese Christians. These experiments allow us to look at how
Senegalese Muslims and rooted French behave toward each other (as compared to the way Senegalese
Christians and rooted French behave toward each other) when altruism (i.e., unconditional generosity)
and trust (i.e., belief s about others’ unconditional generosity) are at stake.
Results indicate that the Senegalese Muslim and rooted French participants are stuck in an unf ortunate
cycle of  behavior, in which (i) the rooted French harbor a taste f or discrimination against those
individuals they can identif y as Muslims, and (ii) Senegalese Muslims, anticipating such discrimination,
withdraw f rom their host community, thus strengthening their identif ication as Muslims by the French
participants.
Muslims anticipate anti-Muslim discrimination and assimilate less 
Our survey data reveal that Senegalese Muslims anticipate anti-Muslim discrimination. Relative to their
Christian counterparts, they trust French institutions less (police, immigration services, justice, school,
businesses, national employment bureau…) and are more likely to reject the claim that such institutions
treat all French people equally. Experience with discrimination of ten explains, at least in part, community
withdrawal. Our survey data conf irm that Senegalese Muslims have a lower attachment to French people
and culture and a higher attachment to their culture of  origin than do their Christian counterparts. In
other words, Senegalese Muslims assimilate less. Our experimental results are consistent with these
f indings: in this French context, Senegalese Muslims are less altruistic towards the other groups, than
are their Christian counterparts (but, as shown in our survey, no less altruistic towards their communities
back in Senegal).
Rooted French Exhibit Taste-Based Discrimination against Muslims qua Muslims 
In our experiments, rooted French players could inf er the religious af f iliations of  their game partners only
through their f irst names, which subjects printed on a label and attached on their lapels. Our experimental
results show that rooted French participants harbored a taste f or discrimination against Senegalese
Muslims: they are less altruistic toward Senegalese Muslims than toward Senegalese Christians. But,
since all Senegalese Christians had recognizably French names (e.g. Christine) while the Senegalese
Muslims had either Muslim names (e.g. Ibrahima) or Af rican names (e.g. Astou), it is natural to wonder
whether rooted French are simply reacting negatively to names f oreign to their own identit ies. Our results
indicate that this is not so: the French discriminate specif ically against Senegalese Muslims with Muslim
names.
And yet, this taste-based discrimination is not compounded in our experiments by statistical
discrimination: although Senegalese Muslims are less altruistic than are Senegalese Christians, this
pattern is not anticipated by rooted French players. Theref ore, rooted French behavior cannot be
explained by their belief s about Senegalese Muslims’ withdrawal. Such erroneous belief s on the part of
rooted French may derive precisely f rom their distaste f or Senegalese Muslims, which prevents them
f rom interacting with them and correctly updating their belief s about their behavior.
However, a f orm of  statistical discrimination may take place in the context of  the French labour market.
Here, HR personnel are better inf ormed about the average characteristics of  candidates f rom various
communities. They are theref ore more likely to discriminate against Muslim applicants because they
expect them to assimilate less and thus to have deleterious ef f ects on the esprit-de-corps of  the
company. This f orm of  statistical discrimination reinf orces the outcome that we have identif ied in our
research, that Muslim immigrants and rooted French are stuck in a self -sustaining vicious circle of
attitudes.
The recognition of  this discriminatory circle gives us clues as to why the current situation is so dif f icult
to overturn – no party has an incentive to change its behavior. But to simultaneously induce a change in
Senegalese Muslims’ expectations of  discrimination by rooted French (and theref ore encourage greater
levels of  assimilation) and a change in rooted French reactions to Muslim signals – such as f irst names –
is a f undamental challenge to equality in our t ime.
This article is a shortened version of the IZA paper Muslims in France: Identifying a Discriminatory
Equilibrium.
Professor David Laitin will also be speaking at the LSE on 28 February on this topic. More information and
event listing.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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